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Abstract
This paper considers the aggregate performance of the banking industry, ap-
plying a modified and extended dynamic decomposition of bank return on equity.
The aggregate performance of any industry depends on the underlying microe-
conomic dynamics within that industry . adjustments within banks, reallocations
between banks, entry of new banks, and exit of existing banks. Bailey, Hulten, and
Campbell (1992) and Haltiwanger (1997) develop dynamic decompositions of in-
dustry performance. We extend those analyses to derive an ideal decomposition
that includes their decomposition as one component. We also extend the decom-
position, consider geography, and implement decomposition on a state-by-state
basis, linking that geographic decomposition back to the national level. We then
consider how deregulation of geographic restrictions on bank activity affects the
components of the state-level dynamic decomposition, controlling for competition
and the state of the economy within each state and employing fixed- and random-
effects estimation for a panel database across the fifty states and the District of
Columbia from 1976 to 2000.
Journal of Economic Literature Classification: L1, G2
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 An ‘Ideal’ Decomposition of Industry Dynamics: An Application to the 
Nationwide and State Level U.S. Banking Industry 
 
1. Introduction 
The U.S. banking industry provides fertile ground for cultivating research on industry dynamics 
under regulatory change.1 The historical development of U.S. institutions, with the strong 
aversion to concentrations of power and with the significant regulation in the banking sector 
enacted in response to the Great Depression, generated an industry encompassing many more 
banks than the norm around the world. During the 1970s, financial innovations frequently 
circumvented existing regulation. Those innovations gradually eroded the effect of existing 
regulations, ultimately dismantling much of the regulatory superstructure erected during the 
Great Depression. Thus, the last two decades of the 20th century witnessed a chain of 
deregulatory actions that unlocked the regulatory handcuffs, enacted during the Great 
Depression. For example, the prohibition against intrastate and interstate banking slowly 
devolved, first with a series of relaxations of regulation on a state-by-state basis, then by 
growing state-level actions permitting interstate banking activity through multibank holding 
companies, and finally with the adoption of full interstate banking with the passage of the 
Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994. In sum, the deregulation of geographic 
restrictions on banking activity at the state and national levels provides a most unusual real-
world experiment on the effects of such deregulation on banking behavior and performance.2
We examine the performance of the banking industry, measured by the rate of return on 
                                                 
1 Kane (1996) provides an excellent historical account of the deregulatory movements in the U.S. banking sector. 
2 Existing work considers the effects of deregulation on various banking issues. For example, how did deregulation 
affect bank new charters, failures, and mergers (Amos, 1992; Cebula, 1994: Jeon and Miller, 2005a) and bank 
performance (Berger and Mester, 2003; Jayaratne and Strahan, 1997, 1998; Jeon and Miller, 2005b; Tirtirglu, 
Daniels, and Tirtirglu, 2005). 
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 equity, at the national and state levels. Aggregate bank performance decomposes into effects due 
to adjustments within banks, reallocations between banks, entry of new banks, and exit of 
existing banks. We modify the decomposition of industry performance measures typically used 
in the existing literature (Bailey, Hulten, and Campbell, 1992; Haltiwanger 1997) and develop an 
“ideal” decomposition. In addition, we extend this new decomposition to consider geographic 
(regional) effects. That extension allows us to explore the effects, if any, of the deregulation of 
geographic restrictions on banking on the state-level decomposition of bank performance (return 
on equity). In that analysis, we control for competition and the state of the economy in each 
state, employing fixed- and random-effect regressions in the panel database across the fifty states 
and the District of Columbia from 1976 to 2000. 
The dynamic decomposition of industry performance requires micro-level information on 
firms (banks) within an industry. The availability of micro-level (establishment-level) data for 
manufacturing industries spawned a series of such applied microeconomic research.3 That 
research effort reveals more heterogeneity among firms and plants within the same industry than 
between industries. In sum, aggregate industry data hide important firm- and plant-level 
dynamics that collectively determine overall industry dynamics. 
Bailey, Hulten, and Campbell (1992) provide an algebraic decomposition of an industry’s 
total factor productivity (TFP) growth into three effects – “within,” “between,” and “net-entry” 
effects. The within effect measures the contribution of surviving firms toward TFP growth. The 
between (or reallocation) effect measures the contribution of changing market share of surviving 
firms toward TFP growth, while the net-entry effect measures the contribution of firms entry into 
and exit from the industry toward TFP growth. Haltiwanger (1997) extends Bailey, Hulten, and 
                                                 
3 McGuckin (1995) describes the Longitudinal Research Database (LRD) at the U.S. Bureau of the Census upon 
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 Campbell (1992) and separates the effects of firm entrants into and exit from the industry. 
Moreover, he also divides the between effect into two components – the “share” and 
“covariance” effects. The share effect measures the contribution toward aggregate TFP growth of 
the changing share of firms while the covariance effect measures the contribution toward 
aggregate TFP growth of the changing share of firms times the changing TFP growth of firms.4 
Stiroh (1999), using U.S. banking data, further decomposes Haltiwanger’s (1997) method by 
dividing banks into those that acquired other banks and those that did not. 
Such decomposition methods share a common index-number issue – the base-year 
choice. Bailey, Hulten, and Campbell (1992), Haltiwanger (1997), and Stiroh (1999) choose the 
initial year as the base. Thus, the within effect measures the change in TFP growth at the firm 
level between the initial and final years weighted by the initial year’s market share. Alternatively 
another decomposition exists of within, between (reallocation), entry, and exit effects when the 
final year provides the base. That is, the within effect weights the change in TFP growth between 
the initial and final years for each firm by the firm’s industry share in the final year. Finally, an 
ideal dynamic decomposition combines these two dynamic decompositions into a simple 
average.5 Thus, the weighting of the within, between (reallocation), entry, and exit effects all 
employ simple averages of the initial and final year weights. In addition, the ideal dynamic 
decomposition of the industry eliminates the covariance effect derived by Haltiwanger (1997).6
                                                                                                                                                                                           
which this research relies. 
4 As illustrated below, the covariance effect emerges as a consequence of the decomposition method. Our 
decomposition method causes the covariance effect to disappear. 
5 This discussion possesses an analogy to the price index literature. The Laspeyres (1871) price index uses the initial 
year, the Paasche (1974) price index uses the final year, and the Fisher (1922) ideal price index forms a geometric, 
rather than an arithmetic, average. Pigou (1920) also proposed the ideal price index. 
6 Griliches and Regev (1995) employ the ideal decomposition method in their study of firm productivity in Israeli 
industry. Scarpetta, Hemmings, Tressel, and Woo (2002) briefly describe the Griliches and Regev (1995) and 
Haltiwanger (1997) methods of decomposition, noting how they differ. We, however, link the differences to the 
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 Finally, since the aggregate performance measure possesses more meaning on a regional 
basis, we extend our decomposition on a state-by-state basis.7 That decomposition includes two 
components, where, on the one hand, the nation remains as the macro unit while individual states 
replace banks as the micro units to produce one component and, on the other hand, the states 
replace the nation as the macro unit while individual banks remain as the micro units to produce 
the other component. 
This paper unfolds as follows. Section 2 discusses the existing dynamic decomposition 
and derives an alternative dynamic decomposition that when combined with the first 
decomposition yields the ideal dynamic decomposition. Section 3 illustrates the technique using 
the U.S. commercial banking industry. Section 4 extends the ideal dynamic decomposition to a 
state-by-state analysis. Section 5 considers how deregulation, state-level banking concentration, 
and the state of the state economy affect the components of the state-by-state dynamic 
decomposition. That analysis employs panel data estimation using the fixed- and random-effects 
regression techniques. Section 6 concludes. 
2. Alternative Dynamic Decomposition8 
Since we apply the ideal dynamic decomposition to the U.S. commercial banking industry, our 
derivation of the various dynamic decompositions employs industry return on equity (ROE). The 
ROE at time t (Rt) equals net income (NIt) at time t divided by equity (Et) at time t. That is,  
           (1) ,
                                                                                                                                                                                          
/ ttt ENIR =
 
base-year weighting issue. Finally, after completing an earlier draft of our paper, Bartelsman, Haltiwanger, and 
Scarpetta (2004) most recently also note that the covariance term disappears for the ideal decomposition. 
7  The decomposition can also extend to the metropolitan statistical area (MSA) and non-MSA county levels of 
analysis. We do not make that extension, stopping short at the state level, since we consider the effect, if any, of 
banking and branching deregulation on bank performance. That is, banking and branching deregulation occurs at 
the state and national level and not the MSA or non-MSA country levels. 
8 Appendix A provides the details of the derivation. 
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 where  and . Thus, after substitution and rearrangement, we get ∑ == tni tit NINI 1 , ∑ == tni tit EE 1 ,
  ,        (2) ∑ == tni titit rR 1 ,, θ
where  equals the ratio of net income to equity for bank i in period t and tir , ti.θ  equals the i-th 
bank’s share of industry equity. 
 We want to decompose the change in industry return on equity into within, between, 
entry, and exit effects. Thus, the change in industry return on equity equals the following: 
  .    (3) ∑ ∑= = −−− −−=−=∆ t tni ni titititittt rrRRR 1 1 1,1,,,1 1 θθ
Now, the number of banks in period t equals the number of banks in period t-1 plus the number 
of bank entrants minus the number of bank exits. That is,  
  .       (4) exitt
enter
ttt nnnn 11 −− −+=
Rearranging terms in equation (4) yields 
  ; or      (5) stayt
exit
tt
enter
tt nnnnn =−=− −− 11
  , and .     (6) entert
stay
tt nnn += exittstaytt nnn 11 −− +=
Note that .1
stay
t
stay
t nn −= 9 Thus, equation (3) adjusts as follows: 
  . (7) ∑ ∑ ∑∑= = −−−−= −−−+=∆ stayt stayt exittentertni ni ni titititini titititit rrrrR 1 1 1,1,1,1,1 ,,,, 1 θθθθ =1
                                                
Case 1: Existing Dynamic Decomposition 
So far, we have separated the “stay” terms from the “entry” and “exit” terms. Now, we need to 
decompose the “stay” terms into within and between effects. Bailey, Hulten, and Campbell 
(1992) and Haltiwanger (1997) each weight the within effect with the individual firm’s industry 
 
9 Consider two time periods t and (t-1). We classify banks as staying, if the bank exists in both t and (t-1); entering, 
if the bank does not exist in (t-1) but does in t; and exiting, if the bank exists in (t-1) but not in t. 
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 share of equity in the initial year. That is, we need to add and subtract ∑  from the 
right-hand side of equation (7). After some manipulation, we get that  
= −
stay
tn
i titir1 1,, θ
  , (8) ∑ ∑∑= = −−= −∆∆ −−++=∆ stayt entert exittstaytni ni ni titititini titititit rrrrR 1 1 1,1,,,1 1,,,, 1 θθθθ ∑ =1
where 1,,, −∆ −= tititi θθθ  and 1,,, −∆ −= tititi rrr . 
 The sum of individual bank’s shares of equity over all banks in the industry in both 
periods t and t-1 equals one. That is,  
  ; or   (9) ∑ ∑∑∑ = = −−== − =+=+ stayt exittentertstayt ni ni titini tini ti 1 1 1,1,1 ,1 , 1 1θθθθ
  .  (10) 01 1 1,1,11 ,1 ,1
1 =⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ +−⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ + ∑ ∑∑∑ = = −−−==− −stayt exittentertstayt ni ni tititni tini tit RR θθθθ
Note that we could also use Rt rather than Rt-1 in equation (10), leading to Case 1a. The standard 
decomposition in the literature, however, uses equation (10). The difference in decompositions 
reflects whether one compares the industry to where it started (Rt-1) or ended (Rt). 
 Finally, adding the left-hand side of equation (10), which equals zero, to equation (8) 
produces, after some algebraic manipulation, the following relation: 
∑ ∑ ∑= = = −∆−−∆ −+−+=∆ stayt stayt entertni ni ni tittitittititit RrRrrR 1 1 1 ,1,,1,1,, )()( θθθ  
   “within effect”      “between effect”     “entry effect” 
∑ −= −−− −− exittni titti Rr11 1,11, )( θ .    (11) 
     “exit effect” 
We evaluate the between, entry, and exit effects relative to the industry return on equity 
( ). For example, the between effect sums the differences between each bank’s return on 
equity and the industry’s return on equity multiplied by that bank’s change in equity share. In 
this case, we evaluate the bank’s return on equity in period t and the industry’s return on equity 
in period (t-1). Because of the timing difference, Haltiwanger (1997) decomposes the between 
1−tR
 6
 (reallocation) effect into a “share” effect and a “covariance” effect by adding and subtracting 
 within the term  contained in the between effect summation.1, −tir )( 1, −− tti Rr 10 That is, we get 
∑ ∑ ∑= = = ∆−−∆∆∆− −+=−stayt stayt staytni ni ni tittititititti RrrRr1 1 1 ,11,,,,1, )()( θθθ .  (12) 
       “between effect”  “covariance effect”       “share effect” 
The covariance effect combines elements of both within and between (reallocation) 
effects. The covariance effect emerges as an artifact of the discrete nature of the decomposition 
method and possesses a “second-order-small” effect. If, however, we compare the industry to 
where its return on equity ended (Rt), then the covariance term does not emerge. Our ideal 
decomposition also mitigates this problem, as the covariance effect disappears. 
Case 2: Alternative Dynamic Decomposition 
Now, decompose the change in industry return on equity by weighting the within effect by 
period-t individual bank’s share of industry equity. That is, we need to add and subtract 
 to equation (7). Then follow the same procedures used in the first dynamic 
decomposition where the industry return on equity in period t (R
∑ = −staytni titir1 ,1, θ
t) replaces the industry return on 
equity in period t-1 (Rt-1) in equation (10). After necessary manipulations, the final form equals: 
∑ ∑ ∑= = =∆−∆ −+−+=∆ stayt stayt entertni ni ni tittitittititit RrRrrR 1 1 1 ,,,1,,, )()( θθθ  
   “within effect”      “between effect”     “entry effect” 
∑ −= −− −− exittni titti Rr11 1,1, )( θ .    (13) 
          “exit effect” 
Now, we further decompose the between (reallocation) effect by adding and subtracting ri,t 
inside the term  contained in the between summation and generate the following 
result: 
)( 1, tti Rr −−
                                                 
10 Stiroh (1999) further decomposes the within, share, and covariance effects into effects for banks that acquire 
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 ∑ ∑ ∑= = = ∆∆∆∆− −+−=−stayt stayt staytni ni ni tittititititti RrrRr1 1 1 ,,,,,1, )()( θθθ   (14) 
       “between effect” -“covariance effect”      “share effect” 
 In Case 1, the between effect decomposes into a share effect evaluated in period (t-1) 
plus the covariance effect. Now, in Case 2, the between effect decomposes into a share effect 
evaluated in period t minus the covariance effect. Similar to Case 1, an alternative dynamic 
decomposition (Case 2a) uses the original equation (10). Now, the dynamic decomposition 
equals equation (13) where Rt-1 replaces Rt everywhere. And again, no covariance term emerges 
from this dynamic decomposition. The ideal dynamic decomposition (Case 3) simply averages 
Case-1 and Case-2. Thus, the between effect in the ideal decomposition equals the average of the 
share effects evaluated in periods t and (t-1) and the covariance effects cancel. 
Case 3: Ideal Dynamic Decomposition 
The ideal dynamic decomposition averages Case 1 and Case 2 (Cases 1a and 2a) as follows: 
∑ ∑ ∑= = = −∆−−−∆ −+−+=∆ stayt stayt entertni ni ni tititiiitit RrRrrR 1 1 1 ,,,, )()( θθθ  
   “within effect”  “between effect”         “entry effect” 
∑ −= −−− −− exittni titi Rr11 1,1, )( θ .    (15) 
     “exit effect” 
where   , 2/)( 1,, −
− += titii θθθ
  , and 2
                                                                                                                                                                                          
/)( 1,, −
− += titii rrr
2/)( 1−
− += tt RRR . 
In sum, the ideal dynamic decomposition includes four effects. The within effect equals 
the summation of each bank’s change in return on equity weighted by its average share of 
industry equity between period t and t-1. The between (reallocation) effect equals the summation 
 
other banks and banks that do not. 
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 of the difference between each bank’s return on equity and the average industry return on equity 
between periods t and t-1 times the change in that bank’s share of industry equity. The entry 
effect equals the summation of the difference between each entry bank’s return on equity in 
period t and the average industry return on equity between periods t and t-1 times the entry 
bank’s share of industry equity in period t. Finally, the exit effect equals the summation of the 
difference between each exit bank’s return on equity in period t-1 and the average industry return 
on equity between periods t and t-1 times the exit bank’s share of industry equity in period t-1. 
Schumpeter (1950) coined the phrase “creative destruction” to describe his view of the 
capitalism, evolving through a dynamic process of mergers, entry, and exit of firms spurred by 
innovation and technical change. Bartelsman, Haltiwanger, and Scarpetta (2004) associate the 
reallocation (between), entry and exit effects of productivity change with creative destruction, 
which they call restructuring, reallocation and creative destruction. The banking industry 
operates, however, under regulation, since instability in the banking system can cause a banking 
crisis and recession, or worse. The public must maintain its confidence in the soundness of the 
banking industry. A process of creative destruction in the banking industry, if too large, may 
undermine the public’s confidence. Thus, since stability proves the hallmark of a sound banking 
practice, we anticipate that the within effect should dominate movements in aggregate bank 
performance. 
3. Commercial Bank Return on Equity: Nationwide Decomposition 
To illustrate the ideal dynamic decomposition, we employ Call Report data for all commercial 
banks in the U.S. from 1976 to 2000.11 To calculate the dynamic decomposition between two 
years, say 1999 and 2000, we need to identify and separate entrants (banks that entered the 
                                                 
11 The data for our analysis come from the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago web site, which is located at 
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 industry), exits (banks that exited the industry), and stays (banks that stayed in the industry). To 
do so, we matched bank ID numbers in the database. If a bank ID number exists in both 1999 
and 2000, then the bank stays in the industry. If a bank ID number exists in 1999, but not in 
2000, then the bank exits. If a bank ID number exists in 2000, but not in 1999, then the bank 
enters. 
Table 1 provides the dynamic decomposition of aggregate return on equity for all 
commercial banks in the U.S. between 1976 and 2000. Several observations emerge. First, on a 
year-to-year basis, the within effect explains the change in return on equity. The correlations 
between the within, between, entry, and exit effects and the change in return on equity equal 
0.92, -0.12, 0.02, and –0.30, respectively. Further, simple ordinary least squares regressions of 
the change in return on equity onto the within, between, entry, and exit effects only produce a 
significant regression for the within effect.12 The within effect, however, does not contribute 
much to the cumulative, long-run change in return on equity, as we show below. The years 1992 
and 1993 reflect an important turning point in our analysis. The strength of the linkage between 
the within effect and the change in return on equity grows for the sample from 1976 to 1992, but 
it diminishes for 1993 to 2000.13
Cyclical movements of bank performance on a year-to-year basis reflect movements in 
the within effect. Cyclical movements in bank performance rely largely on the fortune of 
individual banks, on average. The trend movements of bank performance, however, reflect 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
http://www.chicagofed.org/economic_research_and_data/commercial_bank_data.cfm. 
12 The significant regression generates an intercept of 0.00, not significantly different from zero at the 1-percent 
level, and a slope coefficient of 0.83, which is significantly less than one at the 5-, but not the 10-, percent level. 
13 The simple correlations alter to 0.99 and 0.90 for the 1976 to 1992 and 1993 to 2000 periods. In addition, the 
slope coefficients for the simple linear regressions change to 0.97 and 0.50 for the same two sub-periods, where 
0.97 is not significantly different from 1. 
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 movements in the between effect. Now, trend movements in bank performance rely on shifts in 
market share from low to high performance banks. 
Second, the between (reallocation) effect contributes positively to increasing the industry 
return on equity in 19 out of the 24 years in our sample. As noted above, the 1992 and 1993 
years emerge as an important turning point. In addition, between 1980 and 1992, the between 
(reallocation) effect increases industry return on equity for 13 consecutive years. From 1993 to 
2000, the contribution of the between (reallocation) effect provides a much-less consistent story, 
4 positive and 4 negative years. Prior to 1992, mergers and acquisitions exhibit more intrastate 
activity; after 1992, interstate merger and acquisitions become a larger part of the overall story. 
Moreover, interstate mergers and acquisitions generally involve much bigger banks. Our 
findings, therefore, suggest that intrastate mergers and acquisitions contributed more to 
improved industry performance than does interstate mergers and acquisitions. Jayaratne and 
Strahan (1998) and Tirtirglu, Daniels, and Tirtirglu (2005) make similar observations. 
Third, the entry effect contributes negatively to industry return on equity in each and 
every year. That is, entrants to the banking industry, on average, experience a return on equity 
below the average return on equity in the market. Thus, entry lowers industry return on equity, 
which is not a surprise. DeYoung and Hasan (1998) and DeYoung (1999) note that bank entrants 
generally are small banks that require several years before they experience a return on equity 
comparable to the industry average, assuming that they survive. 
Fourth, the exit effect improves industry return on equity between each pair of years, 
except one, 1999 to 2000. That is, exits from the banking industry, on average, experience a 
return on equity below the industry average. That finding is also not a surprise. For example, 
Stiroh and Strahan (1999) argue that after deregulation, exiting banks merged into banks that 
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 were better run, more profitable banks, on average. Our results suggest that this outcome was not 
only true, on average, after deregulation, but also true before deregulation. Finally, only between 
1999 and 2000 were exiting banks, on average, more profitable than the industry average.14
Finally, the dynamic decomposition that covers the 1976 to 2000 period merely reflects 
the summation of the year-by-year effects. That is, the change in industry return on equity equals 
0.0487. And the aggregate within, between (reallocation), entry, and exit effects total –0.0072, 
0.0451, -0.0459, and –0.0566, respectively.15 Thus, the aggregate change in industry return on 
equity reflects the positive contributions of the between and exit effects.16 Moreover, the entry 
effect largely offsets the exit effect, while the within effect, although negative, is small. Thus, the 
aggregate increase in the industry return on equity falls just above the aggregate positive 
contribution of the between effect. Note that the within effect proves important in understanding 
year-to-year, short-run changes in return on equity, but unimportant in understanding 
cumulative, long-run changes, where the between effect becomes the important player. 
The persistent positive between effect, especially between 1980 and 1992, provides the 
most unexpected result. Some analysts would question the examination of cumulative changes, 
arguing that bank profitability (return on equity) cannot exhibit a trend because competitive 
pressure forces equilibrium at a normal rate of return. Indeed, the within effect supports such a 
competitive story. That is, on a year-to-year basis, the within effect explains most of the 
movement in return on equity. The between effect, nevertheless, exhibits strong (positive) 
                                                 
14 Stiroh and Strahan (2003) go further, concluding that the relative profitability of exiting banks improves after 
deregulation. Our results imply that if more above-average return-on-equity banks exit after deregulation, then 
enough below-average return-on-equity banks exit to keep the aggregate exit effect negative. The reverse holds only 
for the 1999 to 2000 exits. 
15 The average effects equal  –0.0003, 0.0019, -0.0019, and –0.0024, respectively, over the 25-year period. 
16 Note that the exit effect, while negative, contributes positively to the change in industry return on equity, since it 
enters the dynamic decomposition with a negative sign. 
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 persistence that, although generally small in magnitude, accumulates to a sizeable value.17
The positive persistence of the between effect implies a process of consolidation in the 
U.S. banking industry, or creative destruction, that associates with rising profitability. That is, 
the conventional wisdom argues that the emergence of interstate banking and branching 
generated a significant increase in mergers and acquisitions (Rhoades 2000, and Jeon and Miller 
2003). And a positive between effect emerges, where those banks with an above average return 
on equity increase their equity share. One view of the consolidation process in the banking 
industry suggests that it is by and large a positive event -- banks became more efficient 
(Jayaratne and Strahan, 1997, 1998; and Tirtirglu, Daniels, and Tirtirglu, 2005) and better-run 
(more profitable) banks increased their market share (Stiroh and Strahan, 2003). Another view 
notes that recent merger activity increased measures of industry concentration and profitability, 
where concentration temporally leads profitability (Jeon and Miller 2005b). Both stories imply a 
positive cumulative between effect, which we observe.18
In sum, the cumulative long-run process reveals significant creative destruction within 
the U.S. banking industry. Short-run movements, however, exhibit negligible creative 
destruction. That is, our earlier conjecture that the banking industry should not experience 
creative destruction proves accurate for the short run, but inaccurate for the long run. 
4. Dynamic Decomposition with Geographic Aggregation 
Our discussion so far considers how to decompose some industry measure of performance based 
on the contributions to that performance of individual firms, in our example commercial banks. 
                                                 
17 We ignore for the moment the exit and entry effects, since they provide expected outcomes that largely offset 
each other. 
18 A third view argues that initial innovators in new and better bank services earn excess profits in the short run. 
Competitive pressures eliminate these excess earnings in the longer run. But, continued new innovations extends the 
time of excess returns (Berger and Mester, 2003). This view also supports a positive between effect. 
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 The regulation of banking in the U.S. provides some interest in data aggregated to the state, 
rather than to the national, level. In fact, although not used in this study, the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation makes much state-level data available on their web site 
(http://www2.fdic.gov/hsob/index.asp). That is, banking raises the possibility of examining the 
performance of the industry at the state level. Such considerations lead to two extensions of our 
decomposition analysis – (i) decompose national performance measures using the state, rather 
than the individual bank, as the micro unit of analysis; and (ii) decompose state-level 
performance measures using the individual bank as the micro unit of analysis. 
National Decomposition: State as the Micro Unit19
We start, once again, with equation (1). That is,  
  .         (1) ttt ENIR /=
We index net income and equity across states and banks. Thus,  and , 
where  and  equal net income and equity for bank i in state s and period t, S (=51) 
equals the number of states (and the District of Columbia), and n
∑∑
= =
S
s
n
i
tsi
s
NI
1 1
,, ∑∑
= =
S
s
n
i
tsi
s
E
1 1
,,
tsiNI ,, tsiE ,,
s equals the number of banks in 
state s. 
Thus, substituting and rearranging yields the following: 
  ,       (16) ∑ ∑
= =
= S
s
n
i
tsitsitst
s
rR
1 1
,,,,, θθ
where  equals the ratio of net income to equity for bank i in state s and period t and tsir ,, tsi ,.θ  
equals the i-th bank’s share of industry equity in state s and period t. Now, the second 
                                                 
19 Appendix B provides the complete derivation. This national-to-state-level decomposition possesses potential 
applications to decomposing national macroeconomic data, for example, the unemployment rate. 
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 summation in equation (16) equals the return on equity in state s. That is, we have that 
  ; or        (17) ∑
=
= s
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1
,,,,, θ
  .        (18) ∑
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,,θ
Following the same steps to decompose the change in the return on equity at the national 
level, but now using state aggregates as the micro units, we can easily derive the following 
relationship: 
  [∑∑
=
∆
=
∆ −+=∆
S
s
sts
S
s
tsst RRRR
1
,
1
, θθ ]
2
,      (19) 
   “within effect”  “between effect” 
where   , 2/)( 1,, −
− += tstss θθθ
  , and /)( 1,, −
− += tstss RRR
2/)( 1−
− += tt RRR . 
No entry or exit effects exist in the decomposition, since states do not enter or exit. The entry 
and exit effects in the national decomposition will appear in the decomposition of the state-level 
change in return on equity  that we discuss in the next sub-section. Also, note that equation 
(19) reports the ideal dynamic decomposition (case 3) that averages case-1 and case-2 
decompositions. And in the process, the covariance term reported by other authors disappears.  
tsR ∆,
Table 1 also reports the decomposition in equation (19) for the 1976 to 2000 sample 
period. Several observations stand out. First, once again, the within effect dominates the between 
effect on a year-by-year basis, even more strongly in this case. The sign of the within effect 
matches the sign of the change in the return on equity each year, except between 1993 and 1994 
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 when the change in return on equity essentially equals zero. In addition, the within effect equals 
114 percent of the change in return on equity, on average, excluding 1994. The correlations 
between the within and between effects and the change in return on equity equal 0.997 and –
0.04. Simple ordinary least squares regressions of the change in return on equity onto, in turn, 
the within and between effects only yields a significant regression for the within effect.20  
Second, while the summation of the individual within effects and the change in return on 
equity equal 0.0239 and 0.0487, respectively, the year-by-year values exceed zero only 9 and 10 
times out of the 24 yearly observations. That is, the sum of the positive numbers must exceed the 
sum of the negative numbers in absolute value to generate an overall positive outcome.  
Finally, the between effect exceeds zero in 20 out of 24 years. Moreover, although the 
between effect generally equals a smaller fraction of the change in the return on equity than the 
within effect, its accumulated value over the 24 years matches the within effect in magnitude. On 
average, the within and between effects contributes about half of the cumulative, long-run 
change in return on equity. In other words, the within effect exhibits persistence, unlike the 
results for the decomposition with individual banks as the micro unit.  
Unlike the nationwide decomposition, the within effect now contributes about half of the 
cumulative change in return on equity with the between effect contributing the other half. Using 
the state as the individual unit, however, merges the within, between, exit, and entry effects that 
occur within each state. Thus, the persistence that we find for the state-level within effect 
probably reflects the aggregation of the persistence in the between, entry, and exit effects for 
individual banks within a state. The next section considers the decomposition of each state’s 
return on equity. Nonetheless, even though the year-to-year cyclical link between the within 
                                                 
20 That regression produces a constant of 0.00, which is not significantly different from zero at the 1-percent level, 
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 effect and the return on equity is so strong (i.e., correlation of 0.997), the within effect only 
explains one-half of the long-run change in return on equity. That is, market-share shifts from 
low- to high-performance banks explain much of the trend movements in bank performance. 
Once again, some analysts will object to cumulative effects because the competitive 
nature of the banking market will drive the return on equity to normal levels. The persistent 
between effect belies that argument. Moreover, the between effect calculated with the state as the 
micro unit isolates the accumulation of the between effect to two sub-periods – 1986 to 1990 and 
1994 to 2000. The former generates just in excess of 40 percent of the total accumulation over 
the 1976 to 2000 sample (i.e., 0.100 out of 0.248). The latter generates another 40 percent (0.102 
out of 0.248). The first sub-period corresponds to the peak in the bank failures handled by the 
FDIC during the 1980s while the second sub-period corresponds to the most recent legislation 
that authorized interstate banking activity and the significant expansion of interstate merger 
activity. The positive between effect implies that during these two periods of bank consolidation, 
or creative destruction, the states with above average return on equity experienced a rising equity 
share. 
State-Level Decomposition: Bank as the Micro Unit 
This section decomposes the change in return on equity at the state level, . The process of 
deriving the decomposition follows the same outline that we employ in Section 2, except that the 
return on equity at the state level replaces the return on equity for the nation. We report here only 
the ideal dynamic decomposition (case 3) that averages case-1 and case-2 dynamic 
decompositions. After the required manipulations, we come to the following decomposition: 
tsR ∆,
∑ ∑ ∑= = = −∆−−−∆∆ −+−+= stayts stayts entertsni ni ni tsistsitsissisitsits RrRrrR , , ,1 1 1 ,,,,,,,,,,, )()( θθθ  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
and a slope coefficient of 0.99, which is not significantly different from one at the 1-percent level. 
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    “within effect”         “between effect”           “entry effect” 
∑ −= −−− −− exittsni tsistsi Rr1,1 1,,1,, )( θ .    (20) 
         “exit effect” 
where   , 2/)( 1,,,,, −
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  , and 2
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2/)( 1,, −
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Table 2 reports the summations and averages of the decompositions over the 24-year 
period for each state.21 Several items deserve notice. First, the entry effect falls below zero, on 
average, in every state except Minnesota. That is, on average, over the whole 24-year sample 
period, Minnesota experienced bank entrants that earned a return on equity that exceeded the 
average of all banks in Minnesota when those banks entered. New banks typically exhibit small 
size and generally low performance for the first few years. Thus, Minnesota bucked that trend. 
Second, the exit effect falls below zero, on average, in 41 of the 51 states. The 10 
exceptions – Arkansas, District of Columbia, Georgia, Iowa, Idaho, Indiana, Michigan, Missouri, 
South Carolina, and West Virginia – each experienced, on average, bank exits with a higher 
return on equity than the average of all banks in the state when those banks exited. Typically 
when banks exit, some other bank acquires that bank’s assets and liabilities. That is, the exit 
associates with a take-over or merger. A take-over or merger where the exiting bank exhibits 
higher than average performance generates a positive exit effect. 
With the exception of Idaho, those states come from the South or the Mid-West. In 
addition, and more importantly, with the exception of Arkansas, Georgia, Iowa, and South 
 
21 The year-by-year results for all states are available from the authors on request. 
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 Carolina, these states also experienced a substantial (i.e., more tan 39 percent) average decrease 
in the number of banks over the 1976 to 2000 time frame. Moreover, with the exception of 
Arkansas, Georgia, Iowa, Missouri, and South Carolina, each experienced a substantial (i.e., 
more than 6.25) average increase in branches per bank.22 In sum, those states exhibited a more 
intensive consolidation, or creative destruction, on average. That is, the extent of the 
consolidation process necessitated the exit of more than just weak-performance banks. To 
investigate that conjecture more systematically, the next section considers panel-data estimation 
of the components of the decomposition that includes deregulation and state economic 
performance variables. 
Third, the average within effect exceeds the average between effect over all states and 
time. That finding reverses the finding at the national level where the between effect exceeded 
the within effect, on average. How is this possible? Note that the within and between effects 
exhibit the identical effect in magnitude for the dynamic decomposition of the national return on 
equity where the state is micro unit of analysis. Thus, the shifting of assets between banks 
achieves more importance at the national level because of more uneven growth of assets between 
states than between banks within a given state. 
Fourth, the within effect exceeds zero for 37 of the 51 states. A negative within effect 
implies that banks’ performance deteriorate, on average. The 14 states with a negative within 
effect include Alaska, Connecticut, Massachusetts, Maine, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, New 
Jersey, New York, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Texas, Vermont, and Washington. 
Many of those states fall in the North East region. Other states come from the energy 
states. Thus, the recessions experienced by those states may provide some common ground. But, 
                                                 
22 Viewed another way, those ten states went from 3 unit-banking states, 4 limited-branching states and 3 statewide-
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 that observation does not cover all 14 states. As noted before, the next section examines such 
conjectures more systematically, using panel-data regressions of the components of the 
decomposition. 
Finally, the between effect exceeds zero in 39 of the 51 states. A negative between effect 
implies that assets shifted from higher- to lower-performance banks in a state. The 12 states with 
a negative between effect include Arizona, the District of Columbia, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, 
Illinois, Maryland, Maine, Mississippi, Oregon, South Dakota, and Utah. 
The geographic pattern of those states defies a logical explanation. And we do not find 
other easy answers. We do note that half of these states – Arizona, the District of Columbia, 
Idaho, Maine, Oregon, and Utah – introduced nationwide multibank holding company 
acquisitions without reciprocity before the 1994 legislation that extended the legislation to all 
states. The panel-data analysis of the next section addresses the issues more systematically. 
Close inspection of Table 2 reveals potential anomalous findings for the within and 
between effects – especially Alaska and Arizona, and possibly Hawaii. The within and between 
effects each possess large values with opposite signs. Examination of the year-by-year, state-by-
state information yields the following explanation. In all three instances, a dramatic drop in 
equity occurs for one bank in each state between two years – 1985 to 1986 in Alaska, 1998 to 
1999 in Arizona, and 1994 to 1995 in Hawaii – but no similar decline in income, expenses, and 
thus net income. Thus, the return on equity shoots up in magnitude for one bank in one year in 
each of those three states -- -12,717.3 percent in Alaska in 1986, 5,720.7 percent in Arizona in 
1999, and 1,630.6 percent in Hawaii in 1995. The resultant contribution to the aggregate within 
and between effects exceeds 90 percent in each case. In addition, the banks in question exit the 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
branching states in 1976 to 4 limited-branching states and 6 statewide-branching states in 2000. 
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 industry the following year in Alaska and Arizona, but not in Hawaii. The bank in Hawaii does 
not exit in 1996. It still operates with lower equity but now also experiences lower income, 
expenses, and net income. The contribution to the within and between effects in Hawaii in 1996 
when both net income and equity experience much lower levels no longer possesses a large 
effect, because the weighting factor now averages much smaller weights in 1995 and 1996.23
5. Explaining State-by-State Dynamic Decomposition 
Differences in bank performance across states may reflect differences in bank concentration, 
differences in the regulatory environment, and differences in the state of the economy. 
Moreover, those state-by-state differences may affect the individual components of the dynamic 
decomposition differently – the within, between, entry, and exit effects. We explore such 
differences through the application of panel data fixed- and random-effects regression estimates. 
We calculate the decomposition on a state-by-state basis, computing the within, between, 
entry and exit effects for each state over the 1976 to 2000 period in this paper. We collect other 
variables to capture concentration, regulatory, and economic effects. We measure concentration 
in banking (hhi) with the Hirschman-Herfindahl index in each state.24 Several variables capture 
the regulatory stance of states with respect to mergers and acquisitions. One, the ratio of 
branches to banks (brn_bn) measures the effective regulatory stance in the state with respect to 
                                                 
23 Hadi (1992, 1994) develops methods for determining multiple outliers in multivariate data. Applying that 
methodology to our data set for the within and between effects identifies five additional outliers where the within 
and between effects experience nearly equal magnitudes greater than 0.2 and opposite signs – Massachusetts 
between 1990 and 1991, Texas between 1987 and 1988, Indiana between 1982 and 1983, and 1983 and 1984, and 
Missouri between 1982 and 1983 in order of importance according to Hadi’s procedure. 
24 Issues of endogeneity of the concentration measure exist. The Hirschman-Herfindahl index reflects the 
cumulative effect of entry and exit as well as the relative growth of existing banks. Our decomposition of state-level 
return on equity examines the effects of entry, exit, and the growth of existing banks.  That is, the churning of banks 
ultimately affects the concentration measure. Jeon and Miller (2005b) find, however, that the Hirschman-Herfindahl 
index Granger-causes the return on equity, not vise versa. Nonetheless, readers need to exercise care in interpreting 
our findings. 
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 branching.25 In addition, three dummy variables specify the regulatory stance in each state vis-à-
vis bank mergers through multibank holding companies. A state could allow out-of-state bank 
holding companies to acquire banks within its borders with or without conditions (reciprocity). 
For example, some states allow bank holding companies from other states to acquire a bank 
within its borders only for the set of states that also allow bank holding companies from this state 
to acquire banks within their borders. All such regulations became abrogated with the passage of 
the Interstate Banking and Branching efficiency Act of 1994, which permitted bank holding 
company operations on a national basis without geographic restrictions. The first dummy 
variable (regid) is one if a state possesses regional reciprocity, zero otherwise; the second 
(nation) is one if a state possesses national reciprocity, zero otherwise; and the third (non) is one 
if a state possesses national non-reciprocity, zero otherwise.26 Finally, state-level economic 
information includes the unemployment rate (unem). 
Table 3 reports the results of the panel-data fixed- and random-effects estimation.27 Note 
that the fixed- and random-effect techniques control for state-specific variables that do not 
change over time (e.g., geographic location and size). Moreover, we perform the Hausman 
specification test to select the fixed- or random-effects model. The dependent variables include 
the within, between, entry, and exit effects. For the within-effect regression, the random-effects-
model proves the superior choice while for the between-, entry-, and exit-effect regressions, the 
                                                 
25 Many studies include dummy variables for unit, limited, and statewide branching regulation. Kaparakis, Miller, 
and Noulas (1994) use the ratio of branches to banks to categorize states into these three categories. We use the 
actual ratio of branches to banks to capture the branching regulatory effect. 
26 Amel (1993) provides the initial specification for the three dummy variables. Daniels and Tirtirglu (1998) 
updated Amel’s specification through 1995. We extend the dummy variables to 2000, where national non-
reciprocity was legislated to become effective in September 1995 as noted in the text. 
27 Table 3 reports the fixed- and random-effects regressions that exclude all observations with both the within and 
between effects greater than 0.2 in absolute value. The findings generally do not differ qualitatively from those that 
do not exclude those outlier observations. Those results are available on request.  
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 fixed-effects model dominates. 
Several observations deserve notice. First, the within effect significantly responds to the 
state of the economy and to bank concentration, but not to the regulatory variables. If the state 
economy improves (i.e., experiences lower unemployment) or exhibits higher concentration, 
then the within effect increases, suggesting that the performance of each bank, on average, 
improves. The concentration effect proves significant only at the 10-percent level. In other 
words, states with higher banking concentration and good economies support the growth in 
return on equity within each bank, on average. 
Second, the between effect rises with state-level concentration and falls in those states 
that permit interstate bank holding company acquisitions. In other words, a more concentrated 
state banking market that does not face external competition associates with shifts in assets, on 
average, from lower to higher return on equity banks. That is, the importance of the between 
(reallocation) effect increases with less competition, whereby more highly concentrated states 
experience a higher between effect and states that allow more competition from interstate bank 
holding company acquisitions exhibit a lower between effect.28
Third, the entry and exit effects significantly respond to higher concentration. The more 
concentrated a state is, the higher the entry effect is and the lower the exit effect is. That is, in 
more concentrated states, banks that enter tend to perform better and banks that exit tend to 
perform worse than banks that enter and exit in less concentrated states.29 In other words, more 
competitive state banking markets experience more entry and exit of banks, since the threshold 
                                                 
28 Jeon and Miller (2005b) provide a more detailed analysis of the concentration and bank performance relationship, 
concluding that changes in concentration Granger cause bank performance over this period, rather than the reverse. 
29 These findings generally conform to those of Stiroh and Strahan (2003), albeit with a different methodology. 
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 hurdle for entry and exit lies below that hurdle for less-competitive state banking markets. 
Fourth, states with a high ratio of branches to banks (i.e., relatively more-permissive state 
branching regulation), on average, experience a larger exit effect. That means that those banks 
that do exit will exhibit higher performance. Conversely, states that permitted bank holding 
company operations within its borders see, on average, lower entry and exit effects, implying 
that those banks that do enter and exit exhibit lower performance.  
Fifth, a higher unemployment rate associates with a lower exit effect at the 10-percent 
level, weakly suggesting that states with higher unemployment rates experience the exit of banks 
with poorer performance than in states with a lower unemployment rate. 
What magnitudes can we associate with those significant effects? That is, are the effects 
important in a practical way? Table 4 reports the means, standard deviations, minimum values, 
and maximum values for all the variables used in the regression analysis. The following 
observations emerge. The Hirschman-Herfindahl coefficients each possess important 
magnitudes. For a 1,000 unit change in the Hirschman-Herfindahl index (about one-standard 
deviation of its sample movement), the coefficient implies a change in the within, between, 
entry, and exit effects equal to around 66-, 200-, 200-, and 200-percent, respectively, of one 
standard deviation of the sample movements. In sum, increasing concentration in a state 
improves the average performance in that state through the within, between, entry, and exit 
effects. A 2 percent increase in the unemployment rate (about one-standard deviation of its 
sample movement), generates about a 60-percent of a one-standard deviation reduction in within 
effect and about an 80-percent of a one-standard deviation reduction in the exit effect. Similarly, 
an increase in branches per bank of 7 (about one-standard deviation of its sample movement) 
produces about a 400-percent of a one-standard deviation increase in the exit effect. And for 
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 each of the significant interstate bank holding company acquisition dummy variables, the 
introduction of such interstate activity always produces a change in the between, entry, and exit 
effects that exceeds at least a one-standard deviation movement in the respective effect. In sum, 
the coefficients represent important magnitudes relative to movements in the within, between, 
entry, and exit effects. 
What do these findings tell us? The cyclical movement in bank performance (i.e., the 
within effect) responds to the state of the economy with lower unemployment generating a larger 
within effect, as expected. The regulatory changes in intrastate and interstate banking and 
branching activity do not affect the cyclical movement in bank performance, but affect its trend 
movements. For a given level of concentration (i.e., Hirschman-Herfindahl index), increasing 
intrastate and interstate banking and branching opportunities generally decreases bank 
performance, but usually at the ten-percent level of significance. More concentration in the state 
banking market, holding intrastate and interstate banking and branching opportunities constant, 
however, leads to higher bank performance (return on equity), where the concentration effect 
proves significant at the one-percent level in each case save the within equation.30 In sum, 
regulatory change associates with creative destruction in the U.S. banking industry. 
6. Conclusion 
The deregulation of the U.S. banking industry over the past quarter century affected bank 
operations and performance in important ways. We consider the dynamic decomposition of the 
return on equity aggregated first to the national level and then to the state level. Further, we 
consider the effects of deregulation of geographic restrictions as well as banking concentration 
                                                 
30 As noted above, Jeon and Miller (2005b) provide a more detailed analysis of the concentration and bank 
performance relationship, concluding that changes in concentration Granger cause bank performance over this 
period. Stiroh and Strahan (2003) argue that improvements in bank performance associate with higher market 
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 and the state of the economy on a state-by-state basis on bank operations. 
We apply our ideal dynamic decomposition to the return on equity in the commercial 
banking industry between 1976 and 2000 where the microeconomic unit is the bank.31 We find 
that the between and exit effects contributed positively and strongly to the banking industry’s 
trend return on equity. The entry effect also contributed negatively and strongly to the industry’s 
trend return on equity. But the within effect, although negative, did not contribute much to the 
long-run change in industry return on equity. Interestingly, although the within effect does not 
contribute to the cumulative, long-run change in return on equity over the sample period, the 
within effect dominates the between, entry, and exit effects on a year-to-year basis. In sum, the 
within effect dominates the cyclical movements in bank performance, but the trend movement in 
bank performance reflects the between effect. That is, the growing market share of high-
performance banks at the expense of low-performance banks explains the trend movement in 
bank performance over our sample period.32 That is, the trend movement in industry performance 
reflects a process of creative destruction. 
Next, we apply the ideal dynamic decomposition to the return on equity in the 
commercial-banking industry where the microeconomic unit is the state. Now, the entry and exit 
effects lose any practical meaning. Here, the within and between effects exhibit some interesting 
patterns. As for the national decomposition, the within effect, once again, dominates the between 
effect in its contribution to the change in state return on equity on a year-by-year basis. The 
between effect, although seemingly insignificant each year, produces a significant effect on the 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
shares, but they do not consider causality issues, assuming that bank performance leads market share changes. 
31 Unlike manufacturing industry micro data, we do not have information at the branch level that would correspond 
to the plant level for manufacturing firms.  
32 Stiroh and Strahan (2003), using a different methodology, reach a similar conclusion. 
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 change in return on equity over the long run, reaching parity with the within effect over the 
entire 25-year sample period. Those findings prove consistent with the results for the national 
decomposition, except that the within effect still explains one-half of the trend movement in 
bank performance. But, the aggregation of data to the state level forces the individual bank 
between, entry, and exit effects into the within effect at the state level of aggregation. 
Then, we apply the ideal dynamic decomposition on a state-by-state basis where the 
microeconomic unit is the bank. Here, the cumulative, long-run within effect in each state 
dominates the between effect. That is, the between effect possesses more clout, on average, 
between banks in different states than between banks in the same state. 
We employ our state-by-state decompositions to perform panel-data fixed- and random-
effects regressions of the components of the decomposition onto bank concentration, bank 
regulation, and state economic variables. The state of the economy and bank concentration affect 
the cyclical component of bank performance (within effect) while bank concentration as well as 
intrastate and interstate banking and branching deregulation affect the trend movements in bank 
performance (between, entry, and exit effects). That is, deregulation affects the process of 
creative destruction within the U.S. banking industry. 
Lower unemployment and higher bank concentration within a state boosts the within 
effect, on average. That is, a good economy with a concentrated banking market raises the return 
on equity in a state. At the same time, high bank concentration and the absence of interstate 
competition boosts the between effect, on average, whereby assets move from low to high 
return-on-equity banks. Finally, high bank concentration associates with entry of banks with 
higher return on equity and exit of banks with lower return on equity, on average. 
Combining the effects in the prior paragraph suggests a positive linkage between bank 
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 profitability and bank concentration, a well-documented fact in the literature. The conventional 
wisdom suggests that the consolidation within the U.S. banking industry showers benefits on 
consumers of banks services, arguing that banks became more efficient (Jayaratne and Strahan, 
1997, 1998). This efficient structure view stipulates that more efficient banks become more 
profitable, which leads to increased concentration (Berger 1995).33 The market power view, on 
the other hands, suggests that improved profitability follows from increased concentration (Jeon 
and Miller 2005b). 
In sum, the bank consolidation process produced increased average bank performance in 
each state through all avenues – within, between, entry, and exit effects. Interestingly, the 
movement to interstate acquisitions through multibank holding companies caused a reduction in 
average bank performance in each state through the between and entry effects, but an increase in 
performance through the exit effect. 
                                                 
33 Berger and Mester (2003) argue that initial innovators in bank services capture excess profits in the short run but 
that a process of continued innovation sustains that excess profitability beyond the short run. 
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 Table 1: Dynamic Decomposition of U.S. Banking Industry: 1976-2000 
YEAR WITHIN BETWEEN ENTRY EXIT ∆ROE ST_WTHN ST_BTWN 
1976-1977 0.0101 0.0010 -0.0006 -0.0004 0.0108 0.0108 0.0000 
1977-1978 0.0231 0.0013 -0.0011 -0.0006 0.0239 0.0235 0.0005 
1978-1979 -0.0704 -0.0008 -0.0008 -0.0003 -0.0717 -0.0716 0.0000 
1979-1980 -0.0147 0.0043 -0.0006 -0.0002 -0.0107 -0.0117 0.0010 
1980-1981 -0.0227 0.0053 -0.0014 -0.0020 -0.0168 -0.0182 0.0014 
1981-1982 -0.0298 0.0114 -0.0012 -0.0029 -0.0167 -0.0177 0.0010 
1982-1983 -0.0075 0.0019 -0.0011 -0.0020 -0.0048 -0.0054 0.0006 
1983-1984 0.0738 0.0064 -0.0016 -0.0047 0.0832 0.0830 0.0002 
1984-1985 0.0150 0.0013 -0.0014 -0.0004 0.0152 0.0148 0.0004 
1985-1986 -0.0226 0.0123 -0.0015 -0.0111 -0.0007 -0.0006 -0.0001 
1986-1987 0.0164 0.0046 -0.0014 -0.0019 0.0215 0.0184 0.0032 
1987-1988 -0.0008 0.0149 -0.0022 -0.0027 0.0145 0.0118 0.0027 
1988-1989 0.0029 0.0019 -0.0120 -0.0023 -0.0049 -0.0066 0.0016 
1989-1990 -0.0158 0.0023 -0.0020 -0.0007 -0.0149 -0.0174 0.0025 
1990-1991 -0.0218 0.0177 -0.0003 -0.0017 -0.0027 -0.0026 -0.0001 
1991-1992 0.0156 0.0017 -0.0006 -0.0010 0.0178 0.0179 0.0000 
1992-1993 -0.0066 -0.0022 -0.0010 -0.0028 -0.0070 -0.0057 -0.0013 
1993-1994 -0.0038 0.0013 -0.0003 -0.0029 0.0000 -0.0012 0.0012 
1994-1995 0.0003 -0.0041 -0.0011 -0.0010 -0.0039 -0.0048 0.0009 
1995-1996 0.0024 0.0010 -0.0093 -0.0029 -0.0030 -0.0100 0.0070 
1996-1997 0.0046 0.0028 -0.0005 -0.0082 0.0151 0.0188 -0.0037 
1997-1998 -0.0150 -0.0019 -0.0009 -0.0001 -0.0176 -0.0179 0.0003 
1998-1999 0.0720 -0.0435 -0.0017 -0.0047 0.0315 0.0294 0.0021 
1999-2000 -0.0119 0.0043 -0.0012 0.0007 -0.0095 -0.0131 0.0036 
        
SUM -0.0072 0.0451 -0.0459 -0.0566 0.0487 0.0239 0.0248 
        
AVE -0.0003 0.0019 -0.0019 -0.0024 0.0020 0.0010 0.0010 
Note: The change in return on equity between any two years (e.g., ∆ROE between 1999 and 2000 
equals –0.0095 = 0.2599 – 0.2694) equals the sum of the WITHIN, BETWEEN, and ENTRY 
effects minus the EXIT effect (e.g., -0.0119 + 0.0043 – 0.0012 – 0.0007 = -0.0095). It also 
equals the sum of the state within (ST_WTHN) and state between (ST_BTWN) effects. 
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 Table 2: State-by-State Dynamic Decomposition of U.S. Banking Industry: 1976-2000 
 
  SUMMATION AVERAGE 
  WITHIN BETWEEN ENTRY EXIT WITHIN BETWEEN ENTRY EXIT 
Alabama 0.0559 0.0572 -0.0198 -0.0229 0.0023 0.0024 -0.0008 -0.0010
Alaska -4.2136 3.7726 -0.0088 -0.2701 -0.1756 0.1572 -0.0004 -0.0113
Arizona 5.8222 -5.4452 -0.1142 -0.0504 0.2426 -0.2269 -0.0048 -0.0021
Arkansas 0.0606 0.0140 -0.0160 0.0246 0.0025 0.0006 -0.0007 0.0010 
California 0.0041 0.0468 -0.0413 -0.0429 0.0002 0.0019 -0.0017 -0.0018
Colorado 0.0667 0.0392 -0.0515 -0.0630 0.0028 0.0016 -0.0021 -0.0026
Connecticut -0.4477 0.1084 -0.0701 -0.0554 -0.0187 0.0045 -0.0029 -0.0023
Delaware 0.0702 0.0461 -0.2844 -0.2737 0.0029 0.0019 -0.0119 -0.0114
D. Columbia 0.0678 -0.0143 -0.0339 0.0490 0.0028 -0.0006 -0.0014 0.0020 
Florida 0.1292 0.0407 -0.0954 -0.0430 0.0054 0.0017 -0.0040 -0.0018
Georgia 0.2546 -0.0342 -0.0409 0.0044 0.0106 -0.0014 -0.0017 0.0002 
Hawaii 0.7731 -0.6665 -0.0108 -0.0242 0.0322 -0.0278 -0.0004 -0.0010
Idaho 0.1027 -0.0313 -0.0693 0.0189 0.0043 -0.0013 -0.0029 0.0008 
Illinois 0.0657 -0.0338 -0.0223 -0.0245 0.0027 -0.0014 -0.0009 -0.0010
Indiana 0.0127 0.0346 -0.0113 0.0049 0.0005 0.0014 -0.0005 0.0002 
Iowa 0.0096 0.0234 -0.0102 0.0082 0.0004 0.0010 -0.0004 0.0003 
Kansas 0.0320 0.0504 -0.0150 -0.0094 0.0013 0.0021 -0.0006 -0.0004
Kentucky 0.0224 0.0337 -0.0185 -0.0211 0.0009 0.0014 -0.0008 -0.0009
Louisiana 0.0343 0.0789 -0.0209 -0.0010 0.0014 0.0033 -0.0009 -0.0000
Maine -0.2481 -0.0014 -0.0574 -0.0633 -0.0103 -0.0001 -0.0024 -0.0026
Maryland 0.0252 -0.0096 -0.0288 -0.0473 0.0010 -0.0004 -0.0012 -0.0020
Massachusetts -0.3362 0.3453 -0.0929 -0.0848 -0.0140 0.0144 -0.0039 -0.0035
Michigan 0.1562 0.0061 -0.0206 0.0013 0.0065 0.0003 -0.0009 0.0001 
Minnesota -0.0862 0.1166 0.0024 -0.0440 -0.0036 0.0049 0.0001 -0.0018
Mississippi 0.2238 -0.1712 -0.0151 -0.0197 0.0093 -0.0071 -0.0006 -0.0008
Missouri 0.0896 0.0258 -0.0098 0.0271 0.0037 0.0011 -0.0004 0.0011 
Montana -0.0055 0.0578 -0.0231 -0.0267 -0.0002 0.0024 -0.0010 -0.0011
Nebraska -0.0345 0.0172 -0.0113 -0.0740 -0.0014 0.0007 -0.0005 -0.0031
Nevada 0.4834 0.0048 -0.1115 -0.0694 0.0201 0.0002 -0.0046 -0.0029
New Hampshire 0.1259 0.2036 -0.1058 -0.2689 0.0052 0.0085 -0.0044 -0.0112
New Jersey -0.0128 0.0020 -0.0484 -0.0257 -0.0005 0.0001 -0.0020 -0.0011
New Mexico 0.0450 0.0323 -0.0516 -0.0027 0.0019 0.0013 -0.0022 -0.0001
New York -0.1960 0.0834 -0.0493 -0.0619 -0.0082 0.0035 -0.0021 -0.0026
North Carolina 0.1023 0.0079 -0.0398 -0.0290 0.0043 0.0003 -0.0017 -0.0012
North Dakota 0.0293 0.0660 -0.0100 -0.0071 0.0012 0.0027 -0.0004 -0.0003
Ohio 0.1611 0.0050 -0.0212 -0.0290 0.0067 0.0002 -0.0009 -0.0012
Oklahoma -0.0714 0.1067 -0.0243 -0.0378 -0.0030 0.0044 -0.0010 -0.0016
Oregon 0.2020 -0.0964 -0.1225 -0.0280 0.0084 -0.0040 -0.0051 -0.0012
Pennsylvania -0.0457 0.0637 -0.0333 -0.0495 -0.0019 0.0027 -0.0014 -0.0021
Rhode Island 0.0963 0.0403 -0.0688 -0.0098 0.0040 0.0017 -0.0029 -0.0004
South Carolina 0.1947 0.0107 -0.0494 0.0544 0.0081 0.0004 -0.0021 0.0023 
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 Table 2: State-by-State Dynamic Decomposition of U.S. Banking Industry: 1976-2000 
(continued) 
 
  SUMMATION AVERAGE 
  WITHIN BETWEEN ENTRY EXIT WITHIN BETWEEN ENTRY EXIT 
South Dakota 0.6880 -0.0942 -0.1084 -0.0615 0.0287 -0.0039 -0.0045 -0.0026
Tennessee 0.0387 0.0746 -0.0306 -0.0545 0.0016 0.0031 -0.0013 -0.0023
Texas -0.4211 0.4444 -0.0351 -0.0953 -0.0175 0.0185 -0.0015 -0.0040
Utah 0.3434 -0.1206 -0.0873 -0.0248 0.0143 -0.0050 -0.0036 -0.0010
Vermont -0.2834 0.1131 -0.0273 -0.0854 -0.0118 0.0047 -0.0011 -0.0036
Virginia 0.1873 0.1197 -0.0431 -0.1027 0.0078 0.0050 -0.0018 -0.0043
Washington -0.1120 0.0577 -0.0176 -0.0059 -0.0047 0.0024 -0.0007 -0.0002
West Virginia 0.0292 0.0570 -0.0221 0.0240 0.0012 0.0024 -0.0009 0.0010 
Wisconsin 0.0274 0.0132 -0.0206 -0.0189 0.0011 0.0006 -0.0009 -0.0008
Wyoming 0.0062 0.0611 -0.0412 -0.1120 0.0003 0.0025 -0.0017 -0.0047
         
AVERAGE 0.0848 -0.0047 -0.0467 -0.0436 0.0035 -0.0002 -0.0019 -0.0018
         
ST. DEV. 1.0372 0.9474 0.0468 0.0680 0.0432 0.0395 0.0020 0.0028 
Note: The SUMMATION equals the sum across all years for a given state while the AVERAGE equals the 
SUMMATION divided by 24. 
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 Table 3: Panel Fixed- and Random-Effects Regressions of Decomposition  
 Components 
 
Within Effect Between Effect Entry Effect Exit Effect  
Variable Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat 
hhi -0.0011 -0.34 0.0033* 2.88 0.0015* 2.98 -0.0021* -2.89 
bch_bn  0.0011 1.60 -0.0000 -0.14 -0.0001 -0.94 0.0006* 4.06 
regid  0.0047 0.98 -0.0028† -1.65 -0.0012† -1.65 -0.0014 -1.26 
non  -0.0054 -1.07 -0.0041** -2.33 -0.0014† -1.77 -0.0035* -3.13 
nation  -0.0060 -1.13 -0.0025 -1.30 -0.0001 -0.1 -0.0006 -0.46 
unem  -0.0021** -2.09 0.0003 0.81 0.0002 1.51 -0.0004† -1.71 
Fixed- 
Effects 
Model 
(FE) 
 
         
hhi 0.0033† 1.79 0.0001 0.17 0.0003 0.87 -0.0010** -2.02 
bch_bn  -0.0002 -0.61 -0.0001 -0.56 -0.0001 -1.53 0.0002** 2.32 
regid  0.0064 1.48 -0.0029† -1.91 -0.0009 -1.31 -0.0004 -0.36 
non  -0.0012 -0.3 -0.0033** -2.36 -0.0010 -1.54 -0.0019** -2.07 
nation  -0.0028 -0.59 -0.0025 -1.49 -0.0003 -0.33 0.0004 0.32 
unem  -0.0015** -2.03 -0.0000 -0.09 0.0002† 1.82 -0.0002 -0.88 
Random- 
Effects 
Model 
(RE) 
 
constant 0.0086 1.49 0.0034 1.66 -0.0026* -2.63 -0.0005 -0.33 
χ2(6) 6.87   13. 0 9   12.80    24.98    
p-value 0.3330  0.0308   0.0 63 4  0.0003   
Hausman 
Test 
 
Decision RE   FE   FE   FE   
Note: The dependent variables are the within, between, entry, and exit effects. The independent variables include 
Hirschman-Herfindahl index (hhi) based on bank assets, the average number of branches per bank 
(bch_bn), three dummy variables for interstate banking activity [the first dummy variable (regid) is one if a 
state possesses regional reciprocity, zero otherwise; the second (nation) is one if a state possesses national 
reciprocity, zero otherwise; and the third (non) is one is a state possesses national non-reciprocity, zero 
otherwise], and the state unemployment rate (unem). The Hausman test chooses between the random-effect 
model, the null-hypothesis, and the fixed-effect model. The coefficient estimate appears in the first column 
followed by its t-statistic in the next. The coefficients of hhi are multiplied by 1,000. 
 
* means significantly different from zero at the 1-percent level. 
** means significantly different from zero at the 5-percent level 
† means significantly different from zero at the 10-percent level. 
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 Table 4: Summary Statistics on Data in Regressions 
 
Variable 
Number of 
Observations Mean 
Standard 
Deviation Minimum Maximum 
Within Effect 1216 0.0019 0.0496 -0.4153 0.4594 
Between Effect 1216 0.0012 0.0176 -0.2283 0.2198 
Entry Effect 1216 -0.0020 0.0079 -0.1723 0.0585 
Exit Effect 1216 -0.0018 0.0115 -0.2173 0.0690 
hhi 1216 1025 969 63 8247 
bch_bn 1216 7.6580 6.8272 0.0256 38.6607 
regid 1216 0.1604 0.3671 0.0000 1.0000 
non 1216 0.2977 0.4574 0.0000 1.0000 
nation 1216 0.1168 0.3213 0.0000 1.0000 
unem 1216 6.1325 2.1121 2.2000 18.0000 
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 Appendix A: Ideal Nationwide Dynamic Decomposition 
 
DERIVATION OF PROPOSITION: 
 
We can rewrite the change in return on equity as follows: 
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Decomposition 1: [Use period (t-1) as the base period.] 
 
Adding the term , which equals zero, to the right hand side of (A1) 
produces the following: 
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Note that  and . Thus, we have that 1
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Therefore, we have that 
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Decomposition 2: [Use period (t) as the base period.] 
Adding the term , which equals zero, to the right hand side of (A1) 
produces the following: 
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With (A2), we have that 
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Decomposition 3 [Determine the ideal dynamic decomposition.] 
 
Add the previous two decompositions together, (A3) plus (A4). Thus, 
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where   , 2/)( 1,, −
− += titii θθθ
  , and 2/)( 1,, −
− += titii rrr
2/)( 1−
− += tt RRR . 
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 Appendix B: Ideal State-Level Dynamic Decomposition 
Since our illustration uses the U.S. commercial banking industry, our derivation of the various 
dynamic decompositions employs industry return on equity (R). The return on equity at time t 
(Rt) equals net income (NIt) at time t divided by equity (Et) at time t. That is,  
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 Thus, we can calculate, using period (t-1) as the base period, that  
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In that derivation, we used the fact that  Now, we can recalculate, using 
period t as the base period, as follows: 
.1
1
,
1
1, == ∑∑
==
−
S
s
ts
S
s
ts θθ
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )( )
( )∑∑
∑∑
∑∑∑
∑∑∑∑∑∑
∑∑∑∑∑∑
∑∑∑∑
∑∑
=
−−∆
=
∆
=
−−−
=
−
=
−−
=
−−−
=
−
=
−
=
−
=
−−
=
−−
=
−
=
=
−
=
−−
=
−
=
−
=
−−
=
−−
=
−
=
−
=
−−
=
=
−−
=
−
−+=
−−+−=
−+−−−=
−++−−=
−+−+−=
−+−+−=
−=
−=∆
S
s
ttsts
S
s
tsts
S
s
ttststs
S
s
tststs
S
s
ttsts
S
s
ttsts
S
s
tststs
S
s
tst
S
s
tsts
S
s
tst
S
s
tsts
S
s
tsts
S
s
tsts
S
s
tst
S
s
tst
S
s
tsts
S
s
tsts
S
s
tsts
S
s
tsts
tt
S
s
tsts
S
s
tsts
S
s
tsts
S
s
tsts
S
s
tsts
S
s
tsts
ttt
RRR
RRRR
RRRRRR
RRRRRR
RRRRRR
RRRRRR
RR
RRR
1
11,,
1
,,
1
11,1,,
1
1,,,
1
11,,
1
11,1,
1
1,,,
1
,1
1
1,,
1
1,1
1
1,1,
1
1,,
1
,,
1
,1
1
1,1
1
1,,
1
1,,
1
1,1,
1
,,
11
1
1,,
1
1,,
1
1,1,
1
,,
1
1,1,
1
,,
1
θθ
θθθ
θθθ
θθθθθθ
θθθθθθ
θθθθ
θθ
 
 
 41
 Adding those two results together gives the following relationship: 
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The ideal dynamic decomposition of nationwide effects includes two state effects, the 
within effect and the between (reallocation) effect. Furthermore, we can decompose each  as 
we do for the national data (see Appendix A) 
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∑ ∑ ∑= = = −∆−−−∆∆ −+−+= stayts stayts entertsni ni ni tsistsitsissisitsits RrRrrR , , ,1 1 1 ,,,,,,,,,,, )()( θθθ  
  “within effect”  “between effect”         “entry effect” 
∑ = −−− −− exittsni tsistsi Rr,1 1,,1,, )( θ .    
     “exit effect” 
where   , 2/)( 1,,,,, −
− += tsitsisi θθθ
  , and 2/)( 1,,,,, −
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